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ABSTRACT 
 
State consumer protection laws protect the public against unfair 
and deceptive trade practices. Plaintiffs seeking to invoke such 
consumer protection laws often bring class action suits to vindicate 
their rights. However, some jurisdictions have recently shown a 
willingness to enforce contract arbitration clauses that contain class 
action waivers. Such waivers prevent consumers from invoking class 
action status, and may also prevent them from enforcing relevant state 
consumer protection laws. Other courts, by contrast, have held that 
service contracts containing class action waivers violate relevant state 
consumer protection laws and are against public policy. Yet another 
group of courts facing the issue of class action waiver enforcement has 
held that relevant federal statutes preempt consumer claims brought 
under state law. This Article discusses this jurisdictional split on the 
issue of class action waivers and arbitration as they appear in 
telecommunication and wireless contracts. This Article also considers 
the implications of this jurisdictional divide for both businesses and 
wireless consumers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Class action suits and consumer protection laws, like certain public 
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, have long defended 
the public from questionable business practices.1 The Supreme Court 
has remarked that “the class action mechanism is [designed] to 
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the 
incentive for any individual to bring a solo action . . . [and] solves this 
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into 
something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.”2 While there 
                                                                                                             
1 “Where the parties interested in the suit are numerous, their rights and 
liabilities are so subject to change and fluctuation by death or otherwise, that it 
would not be possible, without very great inconvenience, to make all of them parties, 
and would oftentimes prevent the prosecution of the suit to a hearing. For 
convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a 
portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds 
all of them the same as if all were before the court.” Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 
912 A.2d 874, 884 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (citing Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 
How.) 288, 303 (1854)). 
2 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). Judge Posner 
writes, “[t]he realistic alternative to class action is not 17 million individual suits, but 
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remains an ongoing dialogue about the exact role of class actions 
within the United States,3 many contract drafters have sought to limit 
class actions as a means to resolve contract disputes. These limitations 
may be accomplished in several ways, including the use of arbitration 
clauses that contain a class action waiver provision. 
Although class action waivers are widely used, such contract 
language has been the subject of heightened political scrutiny in recent 
months.4 Courts are split as to the enforceability of arbitration clauses, 
especially when a class action waiver is located within that specific 
clause. There are two bases for the jurisdictional split on the issue of 
arbitration class action enforcement: federal preemption and subs-
tantive state law. First, some courts have held that federal law preempts 
state law on the issue of arbitration; as federal law favors the 
enforcement of such arbitration clauses, these courts apply the terms. 
Other courts have concluded, however, that where there is no issue of 
federal preemption, the terms of the arbitration clause and its class 
action waiver may violate state consumer protection laws and public 
policy. Thus, one split is on the issue of federal preemption and the 
second split arises over whether a substantive violation of state law has 
in fact taken place.  
In addressing the jurisdictional divisions in telecommunication 
contracts, this Article briefly discusses the origin of class action 
consumer protection suits. This Article then addresses the arguments 
put forth on the issue of federal preemption, as well as the resulting 
division on the issue of the arbitration clause enforcement. This 
Article evaluates the leading cases favoring the nullification of class 
                                                                                                             
zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30 dollars.” Carnegia v. 
Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
3 See generally Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: 
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
71 (2003).  
4 See generally Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009), 
available at http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.1020: (proposing 
substantial changes to the Federal Arbitration Act); cf. Ashby Jones, An Arbitration 
Revolution? AAA Joins NAF, Stops Taking New Cases, WALL ST. J., Jul. 22, 2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/07/22/an-arbitration-revolution-aaa-joins-naf-stops-
taking-new-cases/. 
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action waivers and the conflicting cases that actually reach the 
substantive legal questions under state law. Finally, this Article 
discusses the implications of the multifaceted jurisdictional division 
and its impact on other similarly positioned market actors and tele-
communication consumers. 
 
I. ANATOMY OF A SUIT: UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES 
ACTS, PRIVATE ACTORS, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 
Consumer protection laws protect the public from unfair and 
deceptive business practices in various contexts, including telecom-
munication agreements between consumers and service providers.5 
Claims against telecommunication providers often arise under state 
consumer protection acts (CPAs), which are also commonly referred to 
as unfair and deceptive trade practices acts.6 Plaintiffs will often assert 
their CPA rights in addition to their common law contractual rights 
because punitive damages, statutory damages, and attorney’s fees may 
not be available at common law. Furthermore, a CPA cause of action 
contains fewer requisite elements than a pure breach-of-contract cause 
of action.7  
Plaintiffs pursuing alleged breaches of contract or CPA violations 
often bring class action lawsuits. Private plaintiffs must, therefore, 
confront class action waiver language found in their wireless service 
provider contracts, which may include a specific class action waiver in 
their contract arbitration clauses. The arbitration clause may contain 
terms similar to the following:  
Any dispute arising out of this Agreement or relating 
                                                                                                             
5 For example, the Washington state statute broadly provides the following: 
“[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 19.86.020 (2009).   
6 Consumer Protection Acts are also known as “Little FTC [or Federal Trade 
Commission] Acts.” Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Model Rule, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 438-39 (1991). 
7 Id. at 439-40 (explaining that the common law claims of fraud or deceit are 
often cumbersome in court because the claims involve as many as eight elements).  
4
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol6/iss1/3
2010] ARBITRATION NATION 19 
to the Services and Equipment must be settled by 
arbitration by the American Arbitration Association. 
Each party will bear the cost of preparing and 
prosecuting its case . . . The arbitrator has no power or 
authority to alter or modify these Terms and 
Conditions, including the foregoing Limitations of 
Liability section. All claims must be arbitrated individually, 
and there will be no consolidation or class treatment of any 
claims. This provision is subject to the United States 
Arbitration Act.8 
In challenging such waivers, plaintiffs have broadly asserted 
unconscionability-style claims under their relevant state CPA. In other 
words, plaintiffs asserting their statutory rights often employ language 
that mirrors the vernacular employed to discuss general contract 
principles. The concept of “unconscionability,” as a term of art, bridges 
the statutory and common law claims and complicates analysis of the 
pertinent case law.9  
For example, in Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 
the court acknowledged that although plaintiff’s challenge to the 
arbitration clause was “couched in terms of unconscionability, the . . . 
arguments relate more to broader considerations of public policy than 
to the harshness of a particular bargain.”10 In Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 
the Washington State Supreme Court similarly observed that “the class 
action waiver clause . . . is an unconscionable violation of [Washington 
State] policy to protect the public and foster fair and honest 
competition” as embodied in Washington’s Consumer Protection 
Act.11 Nota bene the formulation of the claims can implicate 
                                                                                                             
8 Whitney v. Alltel Comms., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) 
(emphasis added). 
9 See J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1757-60 (2006). 
10 Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 n.20 
(5th Cir. 2004).  
11 Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 2007) (referencing 
RCW 19.86.920) (internal quotations omitted).  
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subsequent class certification proceedings and class representation.12 
In addition to private causes of action, state attorneys general may 
also enforce their relevant CPAs.13 Nevertheless, private citizens 
functioning as “private attorneys general” also protect the public 
interest—although not without controversy—when pursuing statutory 
and common law rights.14 This rise of private protection of the public 
interest is due, at least in part, to limited state resources.15 Although a 
conflict of interest between private actors and the public good can 
occur, even in circumstances in which a private party seeks to enforce 
state law,16 private actors remain critical to consumer protection. 
Consumers challenging the enforceability of arbitration clauses 
often craft claims alleging, in essence, substantive and procedural 
unconscionability: (1) the contract “is a contract of adhesion that [(2)] 
restricts” plaintiff’s means of seeking meaningful remedy, (3) because 
of the inclusion of a class action waiver, (4) that forces plaintiff to 
participate in cost prohibitive individual arbitration.17 Courts that have 
found such a presentation of the issues persuasive have also, generally 
                                                                                                             
12 Cf. Schnall v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 225 P.3d 929, 934, 936-39 (Wash. 
2010) (holding that the trial court properly declined certification of a nationwide 
class action post-Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007), where choice 
of law provisions for each individual contract would require application of multiple 
states’ substantive law so as to overwhelm any common issues; in addition, holding 
that even as the Washington Consumer Protection Act governs private causes of 
action, the statute does not extend to protect the interests of citizens from other 
states). 
13 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Attorney General of Minnesota, Attorney 
General Swanson Sues National Arbitration Company for Deceptive Practices (July 
14, 2009), http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/09 0714National 
Arbitration.asp.  
14 See generally Sovern, supra note 7. 
15 See Scott, 161 P.3d at 1004; see also Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 
N.E.2d 250, 276 (Ill. 2006). But see Nina Yadava, Comment, Can You Hear Me Now? 
The Courts Send a Stronger Signal Regarding Arbitration Class Action Waivers in Consumer 
Telecommunication Contracts, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 547, 574-75 (2008). 
16 Sovern, supra note 7, at 438. 
17 Whitney v. Alltel Comms., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 311-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 84 So.2d 529 (Ala. 2002)); see also Powertel, 
Inc., v. Bexley, 743 So.2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).  
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speaking, found no federal preemption of the relevant state CPA.18 
Nevertheless, federal preemption is a primary defense to these types of 
telecommunication class action waiver cases, and remains a central 
sub-issue for many jurisdictions; the jurisdictional split on this sub-
issue will be discussed here. 
 
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION: THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT AS POTENTIAL DEFENSES 
 
Defendants responding to class action suits have claimed the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), particularly section 2, preempts state 
consumer protection laws.19 The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
final phrase of the statute to require enforcement of arbitration 
agreements when there remains “evidence [of] a transaction involving 
commerce, unless [the contract is] revocable on other grounds.”20 
Contract defenses “such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be 
applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [the 
section].”21 In other words, an arbitration agreement under the FAA is 
enforceable unless other grounds—including unconscionability—
provide a basis for the contract’s invalidation.  
The Court provides the additional caveat regarding preemption of 
state law: “a court may not . . . construe that agreement in a manner 
different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration 
agreements under state law. Nor may a court rely on the uniqueness of 
an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that 
                                                                                                             
18 See, e.g., Scott, 161 P.3d at 1009; see also Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 
P.3d 1215 (N.M. 2008) (considering arbitration and class action waiver unconscion-
ability and violation of public policy in the context of computer sales contracts). 
19 Section 2 relevantly provides the following: “A written provision . . . [in] a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
20 Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (citing 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984)).  
21 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).  
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enforcement would be unconscionable . . . .”22 Stated alternatively, a 
state law that discriminates specifically against a contract to arbitrate 
violates section 2 and is likely preempted.  
In light of this guidance, lower courts have held that unconscion-
ability, as a general contracts principle—and not a specific state-law 
principle or defense devised for arbitration contracts alone—may 
provide a basis to challenge arbitration provisions.23 As such, the FAA 
likely does not preempt state consumer protection law on the issue of 
class action waivers, except where state law establishes a right to pursue 
class actions that is statutorily impossible to waive, such as those 
contained in arbitration provisions.24 Nevertheless, the Federal 
Communications Act may still preempt relevant state law on this 
issue.25 
 
A.  Federal Preemption Under the Federal Communications Act 
 
Notwithstanding the general consensus on the unavailability of a 
FAA preemption defense, there remains a second and more persuasive 
argument for federal governance of this issue under the Federal 
Communications Act (FCA). The FCA, originally passed in 1934, 
provides one basis for a jurisdictional division on the enforceability of 
class action waivers contained within arbitration clauses. In its 
pertinent section, the FCA prohibits unreasonable discrimination and 
                                                                                                             
22 Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 167 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987)) (first alteration in 
the original). 
23 Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Scott, 161 P.3d at 1008 (“Congress simply requires us to put arbitration clauses on 
the same footing as other contracts, not make them the special favorites of the law.”) 
24 See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the 
FAA preempts the California Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) creating a statutory right 
to class action). One could construe CLRA as having discriminated against 
arbitration contracts particularly as such contracts are often the source of class action 
waivers.  
25 One should be careful to distinguish between federal preemption of 
arbitration clauses under the FAA and the preemption of state-law bans on class 
action waivers that appear in arbitration clauses. 
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undue preferences among users of interstate services:  
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make 
any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, 
practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or 
services for or in connection with like communication 
service . . . by any means or device, or to make or give 
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to 
any particular person, class of persons, or locality, or to 
subject any particular person, class of persons . . . to 
any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disad-
vantage.26 
The Seventh Circuit, for example, held the FCA impliedly pre-
empts state contract law because, under the text’s plain language, a 
converse holding would encourage price discrimination against 
consumers in states where arbitration provisions are not enforceable; 
such discrimination is prohibited under sections 201-202 of the 
FCA.27 Nevertheless, other courts have held that no such federal 
preemption exists.28  
For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, an amendment to the FCA, eliminated any 
preemption issues that existed under the FCA by removing tariff-filing 
requirements.29 This detariffing released any federal preemption 
                                                                                                             
26 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006). 
27 See, e.g., Boomer v. AT & T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 423 (7th Cir. 2002); see also 
Dreamscape Design, Inc. v. Affinity Network, Inc., 414 F.3d 665, 674 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding the same). 
28 See, e.g., Ting, 319 F.3d at 1139-43 (holding there is no implied federal 
preemption under the FCA); McKee v. AT & T Corp. 191 P.3d 845, 855 (Wash. 
2008) (holding the same). 
29 Ting, 319 F.3d at 1139. Historically, “Section 203 of the Communications Act 
of 1934 (the 1934 Act) require[d] all common carriers to file tariffs showing all 
charges for the interstate and foreign wire or radio communications services they 
provide[d], as well as the classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such 
charges.” Charles H. Helein, Jonathan S. Marashlian & Loubna W. Haddad, 
Detariffing and the Death of the Filed Tariff Doctrine: Deregulating in the “Self” Interest, 54 
FED. COMM. L.J. 281, 287 (2008). The FCC began detariffing in the 1980s by 
removing the required filing processes, and continued the process until July 2001. Id. 
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concerns because federal regulation of the telecommunications 
industry ceased, and instead shifted to state and common law.30 This 
shift of legal authority created another court split regarding whether 
class action waiver terms actually violate the controlling state CPA.31 It 
is this second split that will be the focus of the next section. 
 
III. ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND “UNCONSCIONABILITY”:  
THE CENTRAL ISSUE 
 
Numerous courts have held that class action waivers, particularly as 
they appear in both wireless service provider contracts and other 
telecommunication related contracts, are unconscionable and against 
public policy.32 In general, courts analyzing the issue focus on two 
broad factors—procedural unconscionability and substantive uncon-
scionability—which together can be considered a “totality of the 
circumstances” approach that requires proving both elements before a 
                                                                                                             
at 288.  
30 Ting, 319 F.3d at 1139; McKee, 191 P.3d at 855.  
31 See generally Alan S. Kaplinsky, Mark Levin & Martin C. Bryce Jr., Arbitration 
Developments: The Battle Against Arbitration Intensifies, 65 BUS. LAW. 657 (2010); see 
also Alan S. Kaplinsky, A Scorecard on Where Federal and State Appellate Courts and 
Statutes Stand on Enforcing Class Action Waivers in Pre-dispute Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements, 1591 PRAC. L. INST./CORP. 9 (2007). 
32 See, e.g., Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(applying California law); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(applying Georgia law); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(holding against class action waiver enforcement for telecommunication services 
contract); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law); 
Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C 06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 27, 2007) (applying California law); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000 
(Wash. 2007); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006); Whitney 
v. Alltel Comms., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); Vasquez-Lopez v. 
Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (holding against class action 
waiver enforcement in a lending contract); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (holding against class action waiver enforcement in credit card 
service contract under California law), enforced, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding (1) that Delaware law was controlling, and (2) the class action waiver 
was enforceable under Delaware law). 
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provision will be struck down.33 Courts may inquire into procedural 
unconscionability by determining whether the contract is one of 
adhesion.  
As a general matter, an adhesion contract is negotiated by parties 
with vastly disparate bargaining power, and is often a “pre-printed form 
contract[].”34 As the Whitney v. Alltel Communications Court notes, 
however, in an age of “mass production-mass consumer society,” such 
form contracts are commonplace and are not procedurally 
unconscionable or against public policy per se.35 Rather, procedural 
unconscionability hinges on a factual inquiry into the clarity of the 
contract and a determination of whether it could be easily understood 
by a consumer.36 Adhesion contracts, due to their tendency to favor 
drafters, heighten the court’s awareness of potential substantive 
unconscionability contained in the contract terms, even where such 
contracts are not typographically unconscionable.37  
                                                                                                             
33 See, e.g., Whitney v. Alltel Comms., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2005); see also Davidson v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 2:06CV00133-WRW, 2007 
WL 896349, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2007) (employing a similar analysis in a case 
with an individual plaintiff rather than a class of similar plaintiffs). Some decisions 
consider only one element of unconscionability—either procedural or substantive, but 
not both. Compare Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006 n.4 (Wash. 2007) 
(finding only substantive unconscionability and declining to inquire into procedural 
unconscionability) with Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 
2007) (discussing both aspects of unconscionability). 
34 Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 310 (citing Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 
103, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003)).  
35 Id.  
36 Scott, 161 P.3d at 1006 n.4 (recounting the factual determination of the lower 
court but not addressing the issue of adhesion on appeal); see also Davidson v. 
Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 2:06CV00133-WRW, 2007 WL 896349, at *6 (E.D. 
Ark. Mar. 23, 2007) (considering take-it-or-leave-it clauses, font size, and location of 
the clauses as potential factors for consideration of procedural unconscionability in 
case brought by individual plaintiff). 
37 This may be the case despite some guidance that “[a] court may not . . . in 
assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that 
agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes 
nonarbitration agreements under state law.” Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular 
Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 167 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 
483, 493 n.9 (1987)). 
11
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In contrast, courts consider substantive unconscionability by in-
quiring whether the costs of arbitration are sufficiently low and the 
availability of compensation adequately high to offer a meaningful 
remedy.38 For example, in Scott v. Cingular Wireless, the Washington 
State Supreme Court reasoned that the class action waiver 
“dramatically” curbed “the public’s ability” to protect itself and was, 
therefore, substantively unconscionable.39 Because of the cost-
prohibitive nature of individual arbitration, the court held that con-
sumers would be unable to vindicate their statutory rights available 
under Washington’s Consumer Protection Act.40 
In addition, the Scott Court took further steps to address the cost-
benefit concerns of the plaintiffs. The court declined to view 
Cingular’s contractual offer to shift the administrative costs of arbi-
tration to the defendant as being sufficient inducement to arbitrate, 
due to the remaining heavy cost placed on the consumer in the form 
of attorney fees.41  Furthermore, the Scott Court also shed light onto 
the “meaningful remedy” analysis.  
The court reasoned that enforcing the terms of the contract would 
result in decreased likelihood of representation because “a plaintiff 
could recover 99 percent of a claim and still not be awarded any 
                                                                                                             
38 Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 311; Scott, 161 P.3d at 1006-07. 
39 Scott, 161 P.3d at 1003-06 (providing the relevant contract language as follows: 
“You agree that, by entering into this Agreement, you and Cingular are waiving the 
right to a trial by jury.... You and Cingular agree that YOU AND CINGULAR MAY 
BRING CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER ONLY IN YOUR OR ITS 
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported 
class or representative proceeding. Further, you agree that the arbitrator may not 
consolidate proceedings [on] more than one person’s claims, and may not otherwise 
preside over any form of a representative or class proceeding, and that . . . if this 
specific proviso is found to be unenforceable, then the entirety of this arbitration 
clause shall be null and void.”) (original emphasis). 
40 Id. at 1005-06 (applying RCW 19.86.020 and its sister statutes). 
41 Id. at 1007-08 (observing that as the evidence was presented in the lower court, 
no arbitration claims had been filed by a Washington State customer against 
Cingular Wireless for the six years preceding this litigation). Other courts relied on 
by the majority lacked a factual scenario in which there was a contractual obligation 
imposed upon the defendant to pay the arbitration administrative fees. See, e.g., 
Whitney, 173 S.W.3d at 313-14. 
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attorney fees.”42 More broadly, the difficulty of acquiring counsel to 
accept such cases with little to no possibility of financial compensation 
effectively insulates the contractor from damages available in a CPA 
claim and breach of contract claim.43 While the court conceded that 
attorneys fees are formally available in arbitration, a class action waiver 
allocates the entire risk of litigation costs to the individual consumer, 
while offering relatively marginal gain.44 As such, the class action 
waiver economically deters suits seeking redress for “a broad range of 
undefined wrongful conduct.”45  
Higher courts, holding class action waivers to be unconscionable, 
have repeatedly stated that the substantive unconscionability of each 
contract is fact-specific and the holding should not be understood as a 
blanket voidance of all other similar contracts.46 For contractors, this 
may indicate that courts that have held against the enforceability of 
class action waivers would be willing to reconsider contracts that offer 
greater opportunities to pursue a meaningful remedy. As yet, however, 
the exact terrain and language of such a contract remains unknown—
drafters should be very wary. 
 
IV. DECISIONS FAVORING THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION 
CONTRACTS DUE TO AN ABSENCE OF “UNCONSCIONABILITY” 
 
While there exists substantial precedent supporting the invalida-
tion of class action waivers in telecommunication service agreements, 
there is also support for the enforcement of such contracts.47 For 
                                                                                                             
42 Scott, 161 P.3d at 1007. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 1007-08. 
46 Compare Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(alleging that defendant had imposed improper charges relating to free services, 
additional fees beyond the advertised price, and improperly tallied plaintiffs’ roaming 
charges), with Riensche v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. C06-1325Z, 2007 WL 
3407137, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2007) (alleging that defendants improperly 
transferred a “State B and O Surcharge” that was imposed by the State of 
Washington, directly to the consumers). 
47 “Generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
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example, in Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, the plaintiffs 
asserted claims against several telecommunications providers, 
including Cingular Wireless; the claims included both alleged 
violations of the Louisiana Unfair Practices Act as well as breach of 
contract. The court considered both the procedural and substantive 
components of unconscionability, as required under Louisiana law.48  
Under the procedural element of unconscionability, the Iberia 
Credit Court considered and rejected the size of the font as a valid basis 
for holding that the contract was one of adhesion.49 Under the 
substantive unconscionability prong, the court noted that “the 
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (LUTPA) . . . does not permit 
individuals to bring class actions. Although this prohibition does not 
apply to the plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract cause of action, it does 
significantly diminish the plaintiffs’ argument that prohibiting class 
proceedings in consumer litigation is unconscionable under Louisiana 
law.”50 The court then elaborated on the possible availability of 
alternative remedies for consumers to pursue in support of their 
substantive analysis.51 Regardless, under the Fifth Circuit’s treatment 
of Louisiana law, class action waivers do not render arbitration 
provisions unconscionable.52 When considered in light of other cases 
                                                                                                             
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without 
contravening,” but such agreements are otherwise enforceable. Iberia Credit Bureau, 
Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 166 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Doctor’s 
Assocs. v. Casarotta, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
48 Id. at 167. 
49 Id. at 172. 
50 Id. at 174-75 (internal citations omitted); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
51:1409(A) (2008) (granting an individual the right to sue in a non-representative 
capacity). 
51 Iberia Credit Bureau, 379 F.3d at 177 n.19 (discussing the availability of small 
claims actions as a viable remedy for consumers as well as the right of the Attorney 
General to sue on behalf of aggrieved consumers). Nevertheless, some states prohibit 
counsel in small claims court. See, e.g., Arkansas Judiciary, Small Claims Court in 
Arkansas (2008), courts.arkansas.gov/documents/small_claims_info.pdf; see also 
Davidson v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 2:06CV00133-WRW, 2007 WL 896349, at 
*6 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2007) (considering similar options with an individual 
plaintiff). 
52 Iberia Credit Bureau, 379 F.3d at 175. 
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on this issue, the Iberia Credit Court’s holding and the resulting 
jurisdictional divide have widespread implications. 
 
V. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE: IMPLICATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
 
As the Vasquez Court observed nearly 40 years ago: “[a] class action 
by consumers produces several salutary by-products, including a 
therapeutic effect upon those sellers who indulge in fraudulent 
practices, aid to legitimate business enterprises by curtailing illegitimate 
competition, and avoidance to the judicial process of the burden of 
multiple litigation involving identical claims. The benefit to the parties 
and the courts would, in many circumstances, be substantial.”53 A 
jurisdictional split on the issue of class action waivers has implications 
for wireless service providers, other similarly situated telecommu-
nication companies, and consumers.  
First, smaller providers that have yet to deploy class action waivers 
in their service provider contracts are likely to be at a competitive 
disadvantage within the telecommunications market. In addition, the 
inclusion of a class action waiver in a service provider contract may 
still, as the case law suggests, fail to insulate the corporation from 
liability for certain trade practices. Given these considerations, a cost-
benefit analysis for each provider would be necessary to assess the 
proper course of action regarding the inclusion of such a waiver. 
Naturally, such a waiver does not necessarily prevent arbitration.  
Furthermore, favoring arbitration and enforcement of class action 
waivers will likely diminish overall public awareness of dubious 
business practices against both individual consumers and non-
telecommunication businesses. As the Scott Court noted, “many 
consumers may not even realize that they have a claim” without a class 
action suit; moreover such consumers are not only single individuals, 
but often small businesses and the like.54 Telecommunications 
                                                                                                             
53 Vasquez v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin County, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69 (Cal. 
1971) (emphasis added). 
54 Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1006-07 (Wash. 2007) (citing Abels 
v. JBC Legal Group, PC, 227 F.R.D. 541, 547 (N.D. Cal. 2005)); see also Iberia 
Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 163 (5th Cir. 2004) 
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corporations may, therefore, calculate that the likelihood of class 
action waiver being invalidated is sufficiently low to continue using 
them, notwithstanding the risk of litigation over the validity of the 
clauses. Or still more troublesome, such corporations may calculate 
that the damages resulting from a losing suit are still sufficiently low so 
as to justify the use of class action waivers against customers in other 
arbitration-enforcing jurisdictions.55 Consumers should be on the look 
out.  
In addition, courts that inquire into the business practices of the 
wireless service providers will likely affect both public and private 
actors in the future. The Iberia Credit Court noted that telecommu-
nication provider contracts might also include a confidentiality clause 
within their arbitration clauses.56 Indeed, confidentiality clauses can 
limit the parties from disclosing the results of arbitration. 
Furthermore, arbitration “depriv[es] plaintiffs of the ability to establish 
precedent.”57 The result will likely be that consumers in the future, 
especially in particular jurisdictions where arbitrations are still widely 
practiced, will be less able to know and invoke their available rights 
under state consumer protection laws. 
Finally, the implications of widespread denial of class actions may 
require state attorneys general, or state legislatures, to take a more 
active role in this area of the law to prevent continued use of 
questionable practices by telecommunications companies. On the 
                                                                                                             
(enforcing a contract in which neither party “may disclose the existence, content or 
results of any arbitration . . . .”).  
55 The ethical questions raised by advising a client to retain an unconscionable 
provision in a jurisdiction that, for example, claims to follow a case-by-case approach 
to contract arbitration issues, remain beyond the scope of this Article.  
56 Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th 
Cir. 2004). 
57 Id. But see, e.g., Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 445 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding against the enforceability of a confidentiality agreements 
with regards to a discrimination claim, but not trade secret claims; also observing that 
“[w]here conduct of a party tends to preclude availability of information relevant to a 
litigation and where no genuine basis for keeping that information confidential 
exists, a court or factfinder may infer that the information, if disclosed, would be 
contrary to the position of the party engaging in such conduct.” (citing Baxter v. 
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976))). 
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other hand, even where states have invalidated class action waivers, 
additional considerations still arise, including: nationwide class actions 
and the extraterritorial extension of state statutes to protect foreign 
citizens from the acts of telecommunication companies operating or 
incorporated in the forum jurisdiction.58 Regardless, state attorneys 
general should take a more active enforcement role to combat the 
unfair trade practices altogether.59 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The continued appearance of class action waivers in the arbitration 
clauses of telecommunication contracts may deter individual consu-
mers from exercising their legal rights. Indeed, only exceedingly 
provoked consumers would believe it possible to recoup such a paltry 
sum after reading their arbitration clauses.60 Nevertheless, rulings such 
                                                                                                             
58 See, e.g., Schnall v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 225 P.3d 929, 936-39 (Wash. 
2010) (Madsen, C.J.) (holding, as was noted, that the trial court properly declined 
certification of a nationwide class action where choice of law provisions for each 
individual contract would require application of multiple states’ substantive law so as 
to overwhelm any common issues; in addition, holding that even as the Washington 
consumer protection act governs private causes of action, the statute does not extend 
to protect the interests of the citizens from other states) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  
59 In states such as Washington, as the dissent in Scott pointed out, state 
legislatures could, and arguably should, be the legal body to address the consistency 
problem of class action waivers in arbitration clauses and other derivative issues such 
as nationwide class action suits and class arbitration. Scott, 161 P.3d at 1010-11 
(Madsen, J., dissenting) (comparing the California legislature’s explicit addressing of 
the issue of class action waivers compared to the majority’s policy rationales). It 
should be noted, however, that the issue of federal preemption looms large over the 
state legislature’s authority to address the issue. See Donald M. Falk & Archis A. 
Parasharami, Federal Court Rejects Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Clauses, 14 WASH. 
LEGAL FOUND. 8 (2006), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/100606falk.pdf 
(highlighting the risks of compelled class arbitration as a result of cases in this area of 
the law).  
60 See, e.g., Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004); 
see also Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). This, 
of course, presumes that the consumer reads the arbitration provision in the first 
instance or is aware of the extent to which such a provision reduces the likelihood of 
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as Scott v. Cingular Wireless should put individual wireless consumers, 
including small business owners and other non-traditional consumers, 
on notice that: (1) clauses within their service provider contracts may 
be void as per public policy; (2) a public record has been developed on 
such issues that has not been sealed by an arbitrator; (3) the terms of 
such contracts may change to circumnavigate such jurisdictions and 
states via the use of choice of law provisions; and (4) class arbitration 
may be on the way. Moving forward, consumers and advocates alike 
will need to be both sensitive to a sharp divide in the treatment of 
arbitration provisions and class action waivers, and strategic when 
pursuing potential claims—class action or otherwise—against telecom-
munication providers. 
                                                                                                             
successfully litigating a dispute.  
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